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The Limits of Party-Based
Euroscepticism in Germany
Charles Lees
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Germany is not renowned for its Euroscepticism—party-based or otherwise. In
fact, the Federal Republic has traditionally been considered the Musterknabe
(model boy) of the European Union (EU). It has enjoyed a stable elite consensus
around the European project, with broad cross-party agreement over the desir-
ability of pooled political sovereignty and increased economic interdependence
(Paterson 1996; Rheinhardt 1997; Peters 2001). This orthodoxy tended to be bol-
stered by a relatively compliantmedia; a permissive consensus amongst the general
public; institutions and norms of governance that are analogous to the EU’s; a
strong manufacturing and banking sector that has benefited from the opening up
of European markets; and an ingrained reluctance amongst the political class to
engage in populist politics on the issue of Europe. Moreover, the German Basic
Law’s constitutional constraints on the use of plebiscites and referendums serve to
limit the scope for extra-parliamentary mobilization around the issue.
But German unification, combined with the country’s now-entrenched high
levels of unemployment, has strained—although not yet broken—the cross-party
consensus on Europe. On the left of the party system, the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) engaged in a brief flirtation with a more ‘sceptical’ attitude towards Europe
in the mid-1990s, whilst the communist successor Party of Democratic Socialism
(PDS) remains critical of many fundamental aspects of the integration process. At
the same time, however, the Greens—in contrast to some Green parties elsewhere
in Europe—have become very pro-European over the course of the last decade.
On the right, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) is sometimes ambiguous
about European integration (reflecting the legacy of the internal split between
‘social’ and ‘national’ liberals as well as misgivings about the pace of supply-
side reforms in Europe) but the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) remains
broadly pro-EU. However the Christian Democrats’ Bavarian sister party, the
Christian Social Union (CSU), has resisted some elements of the integration
process. As the ruling party in Bavaria, the CSU has always forged cross-party
alliances at the state level in order to defend its interests and, as a result, has
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also developed links with Jörg Haider’s People’s Party in neighbouring Austria.
These moves were made under the aegis of Edmund Stoiber, the state’s Minister-
President and failed CDU/CSU Chancellor-Candidate in the 2002 Bundestag
elections.
Nevertheless, it would be overstating the case to say that the cross-party
consensus has broken down, and Germany remains one of the motors of the
European integration process—as demonstrated by Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer’s 2000 ‘Berlin Speech’ and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s endorsement
of an SDP discussion paper on political union. But the consensus is under strain
and, as a result, all the mainstream parties were anxious to keep ‘Europe’ off the
agenda in the run-up to the 2002 Bundestag elections (Der Spiegel, 07/05/01). In
this the parties were reasonably successful. Despite popular unease over perceived
price rises after the introduction of euro notes and coins at the start of 2002—and
the closeness of the election race—none of the mainstream parties chose to make
the European single currency an issue. Even though, for historical reasons, retail
price inflation is a highly sensitive theme for Germans, it became effectively a
non-issue in the final month of campaigning. This was reflected in a drop in the
salience of European issues as the election approached. At the start of August
2002, 9 per cent of Germans felt that euro-related price rises was the ‘most
important’ theme in the campaign. This fell to 6 per cent a week later, then 3 per
cent, before disappearing altogether from polling data by the end of the month
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2002).
As it turned out, the September 2002 Bundestag elections were the closest in
the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (Lees 2002b); the results of these
elections are shown in Table 2.1. What is important in the context of this chapter
is that well over 90 per cent of all votes cast in the 2002 elections were for political
parties that, despite the differences of opinion noted above, by and large still
supported the broad parameters of the pro-European orthodoxy that developed
in the Federal Republic over the post-war period. Of the other 7 per cent, 4 per
cent were cast for the PDS, a party that, whilst more critical of the direction of EU
integration than the other mainstream parties, does not mobilize around the kind
of Hard Eurosceptic agenda found elsewhere in Europe (and described elsewhere
in this volume). In so far as it does exist within the German party system, any Hard
Euroscepticism (defined as the outright rejection of the integration project in its
current form and opposition to their country joining, or remaining in the EU) is,
at present, restricted to the fringe right-wing parties, such as the Republicans, that
failed to poll more than 3 per cent between them.Moreover, as is examined later in
the chapter, even these fringe parties refrain from advocating outright withdrawal
in their election manifestos.
So does the absence of a significant party-based Eurosceptic agenda mean that
the German public are content with the long-established pro-European position
of their political elites? The polling data in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 go some way to
suggest that it this is not necessarily the case. As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, up until
the mid-1990s, public opinion towards European integration was stable at around
the EU average but then fell back to about 5–10 per cent below it. This coincided
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Table 2.1. 22 September 2002, Bundestag elections (second votes and seats)∗
Bundestag elections Bundestag elections Bundestag elections
22/09/02 27/09/98 16/10/94
Electorate 61,432,868 60,762,751 60,452,009
Number of votes 48,582,761 49,947,087 47,737,999
% Turnout 79.1 82.2 79.0
Valid votes 47,996,480 49,308,512 47,105,174
SPD 18,488,668 38.5 20,181,269 40.9 17,140,354 36.4
CDU 14,167,561 29.5 14,004,908 28.4 16,089,354 34.2
CSU 4,315,080 9.0 3,324,480 6.7 3,427,196 7.3
Greens 4,110,355 8.6 3,303,624 6.7 3,424,315 7.3
FDP 3,538,815 7.4 3,080,955 6.2 3,258,407 6.9
PDS 1,916,702 4.0 2,515,454 5.1 2,066,176 4.4
Schill 400,476
Rep 280,671
NPD 215,232
Others 562,920
Seats (1998 totals in brackets): SPD 251 (298); CDU/CSU 248 (245); Greens 55 (47); FDP 47 (43); PDS 2 (36);
(Total 603)
Sources: DPA; Bundeswahlleiter: Endgültiges Ergebnis der Bundestagswahl 2002, http://www.bundeswahlleiter
.de/wahlen/bundestagswahl2002/deutsch/ergebnis2002/bund_land/wahlkreis/kr99999.htm and
http://www. bundeswahlleiter.de/wahlen/bundestagswahl2002/deutsch/ergebnis2002/ergebgrafik/html/sitzgwv_999.
htm (data sourced on October 1 2003).
with greater public awareness of the costs of German unification and a growing
uneasiness at Germany’s role as paymaster of the EU.
Au: This
Reference is
not available
in the
Reference list.
Please provide.
However, let us unpack the idea of support for the EU further. Figure 2.2 uses
half-yearly polling data from 2000 to 2002 and tracks the attitudes of the German
public towards specific aspects of EU membership. These are: (a) membership
as a ‘good thing’; (b) the benefits of membership; (c) trust in the European
Commission; (d) support for the euro; (e) support for Common Foreign Policy;
(f ) support for Common Defence and Security Policy; and (g) support for the
eastward enlargement of the EU. Taken in the round, the data show that overall
levels of support for membership are reasonably stable and that the percentage
of Germans polled who regarded EU membership as a good thing has recovered
since the late 1990s. Moreover, two aspects of EU policy—support for a Common
Foreign Policy and a Common Defence and Security Policy—are very popular,
with between 70 and 80 per cent of those polled indicating support for these
policy objectives. Nevertheless other aspects—such as the benefits of membership,
trust in the Commission, and support for enlargement—are only supported by a
minority of the German public.
So Figure 2.2 demonstrates that there is a degree of unease amongst the German
public about the scope and pace of European integration. And, therefore, in
a proportional electoral system like Germany’s, we might expect one or more
political parties would exploit this niche within the multiparty system that has
been left empty by more Euro-orthodox parties. The generally buoyant levels
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Figure 2.1. German support for EU membership—1981–99
Source: Eurobarometer 52
of support for the broad idea of European integration mean that it is unlikely
that ‘relevant’ parties—that is, parties that might expect to have some influence
over the formation and/or maintenance of governing coalitions—would opt to
mobilize around a Hard Eurosceptic agenda. However, in the light of significant
levels of public unease about specific issues such as enlargement, an agenda of
Soft Euroscepticism (defined as contingent or qualified opposition to aspects of
the integration process) would appear to be a workable option for a party seeking
to profile itself on the issue of Europe (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002: 6–7).
But this has not happened. Instead one finds a clear disjuncture between elite
and popular opinion (European Commission 1996; Page and Barabas 2000).
Elsewhere, I have argued that this disjuncture makes Euroscepticism the ‘dark
matter’ of German politics (Lees 2002). That is not to say that parties, or factions Au: Lees
2002a or b?within parties, have not occasionally tilted at the windmill of Euroscepticism. But
these Eurosceptic turns have either been opportunistic and ad hoc in nature, or—
where a more coherent critique of the European project has been developed—
associated with flanking or extremist parties. Thus, up until now, German party-
based Euroscepticism has been inchoate and ineffective.
This chapter explores these themes in more detail and is structured as follows.
First, the positions of each party on Europe are set out briefly in a histori-
cal context, including those instances in which the party or a faction thereof
problematized the issue of Europe as political issue, and in more depth on the
basis of each parties’ 2002 election manifestos (where possible with particular
emphasis on those issues flagged in Figure 2.2). The analysis is sequenced on a
02-Taggart-I-c02 OUP174-Taggart-vol-I (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 20 of 37 September 12, 2007 9:6
20 Charles Lees
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Spring 2000 Autumn 2000 Spring 2001 Autumn 2001 Spring 2002
Membership Good Thing Benefits of Membership
Trust in European Commission Support for euro
Support for Common Foreign Policy
Support for Common Defence/Security Policy
Support for Enlargement
Figure 2.2. Breakdown of German support for specific aspects of EU membership—
2000–02
Source: Eurobarometer 53, 54, 55, 56, 57
left-to-right basis: in other words the PDS, the Greens, the Social Democrats,
the Free Democrats, the CDU/CSU, the ‘Schill Party’, the Republicans, the
German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion—DVU), and the National Party
of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands—NPD). Finally, the
chapter concludes with a review of the parties’ positions and assesses the future
prospects for Eurosceptic strategies within the German party system.
2.2 THE PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM
As the successors of the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of East Germany
(SED), the PDS attracted opprobrium. In the past, labels such as ‘ex-Stasi’, the
‘Eastern League’, the ‘nostalgic association’, or even ‘Red Polished Fascists’ have
been used to attack the party. Paradoxically, this appears to have helped the party
as much as hindered them. The party’s success in entering the Bundestag following
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the October 1994 elections was evidence that the it had consolidated its status
somewhere between that of an ‘Eastern party of protest’ (Lees 1995: 150–4) and
an eastern catch-all party. Subsequent Land (regional) elections—especially their
spectacular result in the October 1995 Berlin poll (where they became the biggest
party in the east of the city with 36.3 per cent of the votes cast), together with
their more recent participation in Land-level coalitions with the Social Democrats
(so-called ‘Red-Red’ coalitions), meant that by the mid-1990s the PDS’s position
was relatively secure. Although the territorial dimension to the party’s support
gives it the potential to become a significant player at the national level, its poor
showing in the 2002 Bundestag elections—in which the party polled 4 per cent
(down from 5.1 per cent in 1998)—wiped out the its parliamentary faction and
reduced its Bundestag representation to just two directly elected members or
Mitglieder des Bundestages (MDBs). This result casts doubt on the party’s long-
term prospects, although it still exercises influence over national politics via the
second chamber (the Bundesrat), which is made up of representatives from Land
governments.
In programmatic terms, the PDS remains opportunistic and oriented towards
the East. The party sees itself as having been part of the reform (as opposed
to opposition) movement in the former German Democratic Republic and
has not explicitly rejected the aims of the former regime. It opposes what it
regards as the Westernization and material and cultural dominance of capital,
as represented by the ‘West German’ political settlement, and is in favour of
decisive social change through both strong parliamentary representation and
extra-parliamentary means. Therefore, it is logical that the party has developed
a sustained critique of the European consensus within the Federal Republic. It
has been a consistent critic of both the terms and, on occasion, the principle
of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project. More recently, Au: Is the
expansion of
EMU correct?
attempts by the EU to forge a common position on European defence and security
policy has led to the party adopting consistently ‘sceptical’ positions on issues such
as participation by the German military in out-of-area operations, and outright
opposition to the EU’s stance on the Kosovo crisis and what it regards as EU
backing for US action in Afghanistan.
Perhaps inevitably, given the territorial nature of the PDS’ support and political
strategy, much of the party’s European policy is embedded within a domestic—
and primarily ‘Eastern German’—political discourse. Very little space was given
to European issues in the party’s 2002 manifesto and those references that were
included in it, by and large, dealt with the issue in a cursory and/or polemical
manner rather than spelt it out in any great detail. In as far as the party’s European
policy proposals dealt directly with the issues flagged in Figure 2.2, they were as
follows.
First, in terms of the benefits of EU membership, with the exception of a brief
passage on the benefits of eastward enlargement (see below), the PDS’s position
was a critical one. Much was made of the EU’s internationalist ideals, but what
might be called ‘real existing integration’ was sharply criticized for being unde-
mocratic and too pro-business (PDS 2002:8–25).
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With regard to the European Commission and other EU institutions, the PDS’s
position was that the EU’s institutional framework is fundamentally undemo-
cratic and lacks transparency. The key reform that the party put forward was
the strengthening of the European Parliament (EP), in order to give the peoples
of Europe more decision-making influence (Einflussmöglichkeiten). In particular,
the party proposed a strengthening of the EP’s co-decision powers and a new
right of policy initiation along the lines of that enjoyed by the Commission. The
manifesto also demanded the development of the idea of a ‘European citizenship’
(how this is would be achieved is not specified), to operate alongside national
citizenships—and the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into a
new constitutional settlement (PDS 2002: 18–19).
Interestingly, no mention was made of the euro in the PDS’s election manifesto.
Paradoxically, however, for a party with such a strong Eastern German focus,
the manifesto went into some depth in discussing the EU’s proposed Common
Foreign Policy and Common Defence and Security Policy. The document argued
for strong regional cooperation, including enhancing links with the countries of
the former Soviet Union, in order to offset the effects of globalization. The party
naturally regarded the European left as being in the vanguard of this process,
which would bring about ‘a Europe of democracy and solidarity’. The document
also raised the spectre of a more militaristic Europe, and argued that the EU
must become a strong ‘civil power’, operating within established international
frameworks such as the United Nations (UN). Interestingly, the party also argued
that Europe must begin to challenge the USA in the areas of disarmament, envi-
ronmental reform, and the introduction of an International Court of Justice (PDS
2002: 24–5).
Finally, because of eastern Germany’s proximity to Poland and the Czech
Republic, the eastward enlargement of the EU was regarded primarily in terms
of its domestic economic and political impact. The manifesto welcomed enlarge-
ment because it was seen as representing a ‘new chance for East Germany’ (Ost
Deutschland—note the terminology used here), not least because it would serve
to shift the region from the edge of the EU to its centre. However, the man-
ifesto also made it clear that the party felt that enlargement would only work
for the region if matched by more public spending by Berlin and Brussels to
improve infrastructure and human capital. EU’s structural policy was singled
out for specific criticism, with the manifesto claiming that too much emphasis
had been put on the idea of Trans-European Networks at the expense of local
infrastructure. In as far as the renewal of ‘traditional links’ with the neighbour-
ing countries of the former Warsaw Pact were welcomed, this was entirely in
the context of the possible advantages for eastern Germany. It was also bal-
anced by warnings that eastern Germany might suffer by becoming a ‘transit
route’ between western Germany and the new markets in the new member states
(PDS 2002: 8–9).
Taken in the round, the PDS’s election manifesto did not afford a particularly
high level of salience to ‘European’ issues and, where they were mentioned, they
were generally subsumed into other topics. In addition, with the exception of
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the party’s proposed reforms of the EU’s institutional arrangements, they were
not dealt with in any real detail. Moreover, the issue of the euro was ignored
completely (perhaps because it was a fait accompli). Nevertheless, in so far as it
was spelt out, the party’s position was critical of key aspects of European integra-
tion including EMU. Thus, the party’s position broadly conforms to that of Soft
Euroscepticism.
2.3 THE GREENS
Of all the European ecology parties, the German Greens have been the most
successful and the best documented.1 Despite the short-term failure of the West
German Greens to enter the Bundestag following the 1990 all-German elections,
the party’s continuing success has convinced most observers that they are here to
stay. In the early 1990s, Raschke and Schmidt-Beck estimated their ‘core’ potential
electorate to be around 5 per cent, with an additional ‘fringe’ potential electorate
of around 8 per cent (of which they could count upon about a third voting Green
consistently) (Bürklin and Roth 1993:163–5). Such high levels of potential support
mean that the party will almost certainly continue scaling the Federal Republic’s
5 per cent electoral barrier for parliamentary representation. Indeed, in the 2002
Bundestag elections the Greens actually polled 8.6 per cent of the vote (up from
6.7 per cent in 1998).
Programmatically, the Greens were originally very much what the former Social
Democrat Chancellor Willy Brandt called ‘the Social Democratic Party’s lost
children’ (Markovits and Gorski 1993: 81), providing a political home for those
both inside and outside the Social Democrats with left/libertarian value orienta-
tions that this party failed to cater for. However, the Greens have made the trans-
formation decisively from an explicitly ‘anti-party party’ to a player within the
political mainstream. This shift is reflected in the party’s attitude towards Euro-
pean integration, especially since forming government with the Social Democrats
in 1998. The stance of Green Party’s Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer is now at
least as pro-European as that of his predecessors. In the otherwise cordial coali-
tion negotiations between the Greens and the Social Democrats, following the
2002 Bundestag elections, he fought hard against Gerhard Schröder to prevent
‘European’ issues being stripped out of his Ministry’s remit and hived off to a new
‘Minister for Europe’ (Die Welt, 16/10/02).
Unlike the PDS, the Greens’ 2002 election manifesto did include a specific
section dedicated to the EU. Interestingly, however, this was not very long and
did not go into any great detail.
In terms of the benefits of EU membership, the Greens’ manifesto made it clear
that the party regarded EU membership as a good thing. In terms of benefits the
Greens saw the EU as the platform from which the party’s long-standing ideo-
logical objectives—international peace and cooperation, social justice, environ-
mental protection and development, and the protection of the ‘European social
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model’—could be achieved. Nevertheless, the Greens were critical of the EU’s lack
of democratic accountability and transparency, as well as its failure to allow Turkey
to join the accession countries (see below) (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 83–6).
With regard to the European Commission and other EU institutions, the Greens
argued for a ‘Europe of democracy and solidarity’ (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002:
83) and regarded the EP as being the most appropriate vehicle for achieving this.
In this sense they were very close to the position adopted by the PDS. The Greens’
manifesto argued that the EP’s powers should be enhanced, and include the right
to elect the Commission President. In addition, it was argued that there should be
a new EU Constitution, which should be voted on in a Europe-wide referendum
(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 84).
No mention was made of the euro in the Greens’ manifesto but, again like
the PDS, the Greens took a highly idealistic stance towards the EU’s proposed
Common Foreign Policy and CommonDefence and Security Policy. Like the PDS,
the Greens argued against the militarization of the EU and for a strategy of civil
power. Moreover, the manifesto stated that in order to reduce the influence of the
member states’ national interests, the EP and Commission should assume primary
responsibility for these policy areas. The manifesto argued that the creation of a
European Rapid Reaction Force should not be seen as the first step to the creation
of a ‘European Superpower’ (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 85).
Finally, on the topic of the eastward enlargement of the EU, the Greens regarded
this as an historic opportunity to overcome the division of Europe. The manifesto
argued for a quick conclusion and ratification of the enlargement treaty, with
the aim of allowing voters in the accession countries to take part in the 2004 EP
elections. Moreover, the Greens argued that Turkey should be given some kind
of ‘perspective’ on integration (Integrationsperspektive) as soon as its human- and
minority-rights record allowed (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002: 85).
To sum up, the Greens’ position on Europe was qualitatively different from
that of the PDS. Although the concerns it raised about the democratic deficit
and the potential for militarism were similar ones, it accepted in principle the
key policy areas associated with the European integration process, such as EMU.
In addition, even where similarities existed between the two parties’ positions,
they were different in terms of tone and discourse. This raises the issue of the
importance of discourse in adding nuance andmeaning to policy positions, which
is discussed further in the conclusion.
2.4 THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
The SDP is, along with the CDU, one of the Federal Republic’s two Volksparteien
(‘people’s party’ or catch-all party). The party’s origins can be found in the failed
revolutionary fervour of 1848. The party first came to power at the end of the
First World War, and played a major role in a number of coalition governments
during the Weimar era before being suppressed under the Nazis. Following the
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defeat of Hitler in 1945, the party was able to remobilize, initially under the aegis
of all the occupying powers. However, in the Soviet zones it was forcibly merged
with the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1946. Thereafter, the SDP was a
party exclusively of the Federal Republic. At this time the party remained in many
respects a Marxist-inspired party of the non-communists left. However, it slowly
came to terms with the post-war settlement, the division of Germany, and the
‘social market economy’, culminating in the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959,
where the party adopted a new draft of policies. The party has enjoyed two periods
in government: first, between 1966 and 1982 (in coalition first with the Christian
Democrats and then the Free Democrats), and second, since 1998 (in coalition
with the Greens).
Programmatically, the Social Democrats’ acceptance of the Federal Republic’s
political economy has meant an acceptance of the European orthodoxy as well.
However, this was a gradual process and in the early years the party remained
relatively hostile to the European integration process. As Haas observes, this was
especially pronounced with regard to the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty ratification process, in which ‘every aspect of the Treaty was subjected
to bitter criticism’, with particular opprobrium reserved for the ‘dictatorial and
capitalist-dominated High Authority’ (Haas 1958: 131). In addition, the party
feared that European integration would set back what was still its goal of a
unified and neutral Germany (Haas 1958: 131–8). However, from 1955 onwards
the party’s position became increasingly pro-European and, during the 1970s,
two Social Democrat Chancellors—Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt—oversaw
Germany’s rise to become the undisputed core country within the European
Communities. This was underlined by the German mark’s position as the anchor
currency in the European Monetary System.
Despite the SDP’s historical acceptance of the European project, it did once
more flirt with a Eurosceptical policy position in the run-up to the March 1996
state elections in Baden-Württemberg, which took place during a period of high
issue salience for the topic of EMU. The party was encouraged by opinion poll data
that showed that as much as 80 per cent of the population harboured doubts about
the stability of the European currency (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15/11/95),
and attempted to mobilize around this discontent during the election campaign
in the state. The state party’s candidate for Minister-President, Dieter Spöri—in
a strategy encouraged by the party’s national leadership—questioned the timing
and scope of the EMU process. He argued for a delay of at least five years and,
in the meantime, a reintroduction of narrow currency fluctuation margins within
the European Monetary System. Furthermore, Spöri cast doubt on the advisabil-
ity of going ahead with EMU without the UK being on board (Südwest-Presse,
11/01/96).
Many observers believed that the state party would benefit from making EMU
a campaign issue but, in the event, Spöri’s criticisms of the process failed to make
a positive impact. In the Land elections, the party’s share of the vote dropped
from 29.5 per cent to 25.1 per cent. Analyses of the elections indicate that voters
regarded the party’s stance on EMU as inconsistent and opportunistic, and only
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the far right Republican party, which had consistently opposed EMU, benefited
from raising it as an issue (Rheinhardt 1997).
The Social Democrats’ position on Europe can be described as one of enlight-
ened self-interest—summed up in the phrase ‘we belong to Europe and Europe
belongs to us. . . . [but] . . .Germany remains our homeland’ (SPD 2002: 14). By
and large, the party’s manifesto position was an intergovernmentalist one, with
the exception of its support for enhancing the power of the EP (see below). How-
ever, even this can be interpreted in ‘national interest’ terms, given that Germany
returns the most members of European Parliament (MEPs) to the EP.
In terms of the benefits of EU membership, much was made of the European
project as a vehicle for mutual security and cooperation, but this was balanced by
a discourse of national interest(s) and the ‘weight’ of Germany’s ‘voice’. Crucially,
the EU was portrayed in the manifesto as a counterweight to (or constraint upon)
globalization—in the Jospin/Lafontaine tradition, rather than the Blairite vision
of using the EU in order to adapt to globalization. In particular, much was made
of the need to preserve the European Social Model at the European level (SPD
2002: 11–17).
The Social Democrats’ attitude towards the European Commission and other
EU institutions was that they must be ‘democratically legitimate and politically
efficient’. Two (interconnected) areas were flagged in the manifesto. First, the need
to establish a European Constitution—including the incorporation of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights and the redrawing of competencies between different levels
of governance—and, second, the enhancement of the powers of the EP, to include
the election of the Commission President (SPD 2002: 16–17).
Unlike the PDS and the Greens, the Social Democrats did address the issue
of the euro briefly, arguing that ‘the Euro strengthens Europe and enhances
the stability of world financial system, from which all domestic economies
profit’. At the same time, however, this was balanced by a vaguely worded pas-
sage calling for more ‘consultation’ between the European Central Bank (ECB),
business/trade union interests (Tarifvertragsparteien), and member state gov-
ernments. This was obviously a pointer to Germany’s dissatisfaction with the
rules governing the ECB’s monetary policy set out in the EU’s Stability Pact
(SPD 2002: 15).
Like the party’s Green coalition partners, the Social Democrats were very posi-
tive about developing a ‘European’ foreign and security policy identity. However,
at the same time the party’s 2002 manifesto clearly states that this had to be
regarded as being complementary to the transatlantic alliance with the USA,
which remained ‘the foundation of European security’. Unlike the Greens, the
Social Democrats placed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the core
of Germany’s foreign policy interests. In addition, the party argued for the creation
of a common European border police to defend the Union against ‘organized
crime and illegal immigration’ (SPD 2002: 15–16).
In terms of eastward enlargement of the EU, the Social Democrats, like the
Greens, were positive, albeit framing this within a discourse that focussed more
on tangible domestic benefits (bigger markets, more jobs). Unlike the Greens,
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however, the Social Democrats’ manifesto stressed the need to maintain ‘sensible’
transition policies such as the seven-year constraints on the free movement of
labour and services between most of the EU and its new member states (SPD
2002: 16).
The Social Democrats’ position towards Europe was, therefore, more pragmatic
than idealistic. Much was made of national interest(s) and the domestic benefits of
EU integration. As such, the party’s position was qualitatively different from that
of its Green coalition partners. At the same time, however, the party was defending
or advocating policies/positions that were meant to become common ‘Red–Green’
coalition policy. So, to sum up, the party’s position remained part of the pro-
European consensus.
2.5 THE FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
The FDP is the liberal party of the Federal Republic of Germany. However some
observers have, on the strength of content analysis of party documents, assigned
the party a position to the right of the CDU/CSU (Budge and Keman 1990).
This an artefact of the history of the FDP, which was the first German liberal
party to achieve a modus operandi between the two conflicting wings—social
and economic/national—of German liberalism. This tension was apparent in
the early years of the European integration process. For instance, although the
party eventually ratified the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, there
was considerable internal disagreement over its provisions and the impact they
would have on the German national interest. Moreover, in the late 1950s, the party
temporarily rediscovered its misgivings about the European integration process,
which it regarded as being antithetical to the goal of German unification (Haas
1958: 135).
The tension between the two wings of the Free Democrats has a territorial
dimension, with the progressives better represented in the south-western Länder
and the Hansa city-states, and the national-liberal wing strongest in the Länder
of Hesse, Lower Saxony, and North-Rhine Westphalia (the party is still weak
in the former East Germany). The North-Rhine Westphalia party, in particular,
has a disproportionate impact on national politics. In the run-up to the 2002
Bundestag elections, state party boss Jürgen Möllemann raised the temperature
of the campaign with a number of pro-Arab and, some argued, anti-Semitic
pronouncements. In the elections, the party polled 7.4 per cent of the vote. This
was up from 6.2 per cent in 1998, but nowhere near the party’s stated target of
18 per cent.
Despite the dissenting voices who put the Free Democrats to the right of the
Christian Democrats, most observers have regarded the party’s programme as a
centrist one, in keeping with the its role as the ‘pivot’ party in the process of
coalition formation (Padgett 1993; Pappi 1994). This moderation has extended
to the party’s European policy, not least because under both Social Democrat and
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Christian Democrat-led coalitions, the party has provided the foreign minister.
The party’s ‘insider’ status regarding Europe, combined with working within the
constraints of the Chancellor’s ‘guidelines competences’ (Richtlinienkompetenz)
hasmeant that it has had a stake inmaintaining the continuity of Germany’s stance
on European issues. However with the entry of the Greens and the Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism into the national party system during the 1980s and early 1990s,
the Free Democrats’ pivotal status has been reduced and the party has become
part of the Christian Democrat-dominated right wing ‘bloc’ in a predominantly
two-bloc system (Lees 2001). But as long as the Christian Democrats remainAu: Lees
2001a or b? pro-European in outlook there is little sense for the Free Democrats to change
their stance on Europe at the national level, although individual state parties may
do so.
As already noted, the Free Democrats have a great deal of foreign policy com-
petence. It is not, therefore, surprising that the party’s manifesto has the longest
and most detailed section on European issues (FDP 2000: 78–82).Au: EDP 2000
not available
in the
reference list.
Please provide.
In terms of the benefits of EU membership, the Free Democrats were pro-
European in tone, as would be expected from such an ‘insider’ party. At the
same time, the 2002 manifesto was critical about some aspects of the Union—
particularly the functioning of its institutions and the failure to complete some
aspects of the Single Market Programme (see below). By and large the benefits of
membership were framed in commercial terms.
The Free Democrats’ manifesto position on European institutional arrange-
ments was explicitly federalist. Themanifesto argued that the existing institutional
configuration was no longer adequate and a new constitution—setting out the
division of competences between different tiers of governance—was required. The
party argued that the Charter of Fundamental Rights should form the foundation
of such a constitution, and that the final document should be voted on in a
referendum (although it was not made clear whether this would be Europe-wide
or national in nature). In addition, the party argued for more powers for the EP,
particularly in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. This would be matched by
an enhancement of the power of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (FPD 2002:
79–81).
The euro was only mentioned in a substantive way in relation to the liberaliza-
tion of European markets. The manifesto argued that the euro is not in itself a
solution to Europe’s structural problems and would only work in the context of
Europe-wide supply-side reforms (FPD 2002: 81).
With regard to a Common Foreign Policy and Common Defence and Secu-
rity Policy, the Free Democrats regarded the EU as the appropriate platform to
build what it referred to as a ‘value-oriented’ (werteorientierte) or ethical foreign
policy, but little detail was provided. Interestingly, more emphasis was placed
upon defence and security policy. There were two strands to this. First, the party
manifesto welcomed the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, which was regarded
as being complementary to NATO and the transatlantic alliance. Ultimately, the
Rapid Reaction Force was seen as the precursor to a combined European Defence
Force under a unified command structure. Second, these developments were again
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seen in commercial terms, with the standardization of military equipment leading
to co-ordinated Europe-wide defence-related production and research and devel-
opment (FPD 2002: 80).
The Free Democrats regarded eastward enlargement as a historic opportunity
to overcome the division of Europe, but argued that this had to be the catalyst
for reform of EU institutions, as well as the Common Agricultural Policy and
Structural funds. Finally, in keeping with the party’s neo-liberal instincts, it criti-
cized the transitional restrictions on themovement of labour and services between
existing and new member states (FPD 2002: 79–80).
To sum up, the Free Democrats’ position on European integration was positive
and it espoused a federalist solution to the increasing complexity of European gov-
ernance. The 2002manifesto went into amarked degree of detail, arguing formore
power for the EP and ECJ. At the same time, however, the document eschewed
the kind of idealistic rhetoric found in the Greens’ and Christian Democrats’
manifestos. Rather, the party’s position was a pragmatic one that stressed the
opportunities presented by integration for German business and consumers. The
party was clearly in favour of more commercial and personal freedom. This rep-
resented a successful synthesis of two—the economic and the social—of the three
often competing ideological strands within German liberalism. It gave the party’s
European position a different tone from that found in the other parties’ mani-
festos. Nevertheless, in substantive terms the party’s position on European inte-
gration was firmly one of pro-European orthodoxy.
2.6 THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/CHRISTIAN
SOCIAL UNION
The particular circumstances of occupied Germany in the period 1945–9 were
crucial in determining the character of the CDU and its Bavarian sister party
the CSU. The immediate post-war years saw a widespread rejection of narrow
bourgeois conservatism, because of its failure to counter fascism in the 1930s. For
the same reason, there was some recognition that confessional parties, such as
the Catholic Zentrum, had also conspicuously failed to hold the middle ground
during the period of the Weimar Republic. The two parties were, therefore,
explicitly set up as broadly based ‘catch-all’ parties. Because of its national status,
the CDU can be described as a fully fledged Volkspartei. However, although the
CSU performs a similar role in Bavaria, in national terms it is considered to be
a regional party. The two parties operate within a single parliamentary group
(Fraktion) in the Bundestag. In 2002, the Christian Democrats polled 29.5 per cent
of the votes (up from 28.4 per cent in 1998) and the CSU 9 per cent (up from
6.7 per cent).
Programmatically, the two parties have common policy principles with their
sister parties which can be identified as a specific Christian-Democratic ‘mix’.
First, they share a broad commitment to such ‘Christian’ values—based on
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Catholic social theory—regarding basic human rights, individual freedom, and
the primacy of the family. Second, they support the liberal conception of democ-
racy. Finally, they espouse an integrative function. This integrative function
takes place both nationally, through the Volkspartei principle, and internationally
through the processes of European integration. The two parties have, therefore,
been the most pro-European of all the mainstream parties, although different
factions within them have had different rationales for this position. As Haas points
out, the Christian Democrats’ initial enthusiasm for the European project was
not just informed by the ‘triptych of self-conscious anti-Nazism, Christian values
and dedication to European unity as a means of redemption for past German
sins’. It was also motivated by the desire to shake off some of the burden of
Allied oversight of German affairs, including the abolition of the International
Ruhr Authority, and to establish a free trade area in Europe. Politicians such as
the party’s Finance Minister Ludwig Erhard confidently—and, as it turned out,
rightly expected German industry to dominate such a free trade area (Haas 1958:
127–8).
The CDU/CSU’s long pro-European tradition notwithstanding, there have been
instances when both parties have taken a more critical stance on Europe. For the
Christian Democrats, the most recent example took place in 1996 and involved
the dominant faction of the state party in Saxony. In June 1996, the European
Commission declared that the decision of the Christian Democrat-governed state
to grant a subsidy of DM779 million to Volkswagen, which operated a plant
in the town of Mosel, was illegal under EU competition law. This prompted
Minister-President Kurt Biedenkopf to issue a legal challenge to the decision
(Sächsiches Staatskanzlei 1996). The issue was finally resolved but generatedAu: This
reference is
not available
in the
reference list.
Please provide.
much resentment about a perceived encroachment on the rights of the German
states. It is also interesting to note that when the terms and conditions of EMU
were being ratified by the Bundesrat in 1998, Saxony was the only German state
that abstained in the vote (all the others voted in favour)—indicating that the
state government still resented what it regarded as interference from Brussels. In
the end, however, Biedenkopf ’s defiance of Brussels was of limited importance
because it did not involve the national party (indeed, the then Christian Democrat
Chancellor Helmut Kohl put enormous pressure on Biedenkopf to back down over
the dispute).
A more significant example of a coherent ‘sceptic’ agenda can be seen in the
CSU state party in Bavaria. At the national level, the party’s self-ascribed role is
as a ‘conservative corrective’ to both the CDU’s moderate wing and also, prior to
the CDU/CSU-Free Democrat coalition losing power in 1998, to the influence
of the liberal Free Democrats. However, the real centre of gravity within the
party lies at the state level, where the CSU pushes a more aggressively ‘Bavarian’
and ‘nationalist’ agenda (Sutherland 2001: 29). This Bavarian agenda mobilizes
around the state’s sense of ‘otherness’ within the Federal Republic as well as resent-
ment at the level of fiscal transfers between rich and poor states. Interestingly,
in recent years, Minister-President Edmund Stoiber has reacted to the ongoing
Europeanization of policymaking in the Federal Republic by developing a
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‘Bavarian’ position on some of the key areas of the European project as well. The
catalyst for this development was the post-1989 transformation of Central and
Eastern Europe, and was underpinned by two elements of realpolitik. The first was
the need to stabilize the region and enhance Bavaria’s ‘security’, in the face of pos-
sible upheaval in Central and Eastern Europe The second element was to use the
issue of enlargement to reform of the EU itself and, in particular, constrain what
was regarded as Brussels interventionism. Over the course of the 1990s, this dis-
course developed to the point that it has been described as ‘an anti-interventionist
position that has come close at times to UK-style Euroscepticism’ (Jeffery and
Collins 1998: 91). However, in later years Stoiber moderated his state’s position on
these issues, in order to position himself for his bid to become German Chancellor
in 2002.
The CDU/CSU is one of the historical architects of European integration. As
a result, its position has been the most pro-European of the major parties. At the
same time, the party has had to react to public unease about Germany’s position as
the paymaster of the Union and a more general sense that Germany should exert
more influence within it. The tension between these two positions is clear in the
Christian Democrats’ 2002 manifesto (CDU 2000: 64–7).
In terms of the benefits of EU membership, the CDU/CSU manifesto made
it clear that the EU was a good thing, stating that ‘the unification of Europe
is the most valuable legacy of the Twentieth Century’. At the same time, the
manifesto argued that the Union had to be ‘more fairly’ financed by reforming
the EU’s system of structural funds and reducing the burden on German tax-
payers. Germany’s influence within Europe, which the parties argued has waned
under the Schröder administration, was also to be enhanced. The manifesto also
stressed that the German language—which, it pointed out, is the native tongue for
more Europeans than any other language—should be given official status within
the Union (see below) (CDU 2000: 64–6).
The CDU/CSU’s position on the European institutions was more critical than
was the case in the time of Helmut Kohl’s leadership, and closer to the posi-
tion that Stoiber had spelled out in Bavaria. The manifesto argued that in
order to ‘strengthen the legitimacy’ of the institutions, the European Council
had to share its legal and budgetary powers with the EP. Moreover, each mem-
ber state’s share of EP seats should more accurately reflect its population, thus
increasing Germany’s share. In addition, as already noted, the manifesto argued
that member state budget contributions should be recalculated, based on each
nation’s GDP. Finally, the parties’ manifesto argued for a new EU constitution,
based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which would set out the compe-
tences of each tier of governance. The responsibilities of the EU, the document
argued, ‘must be clear, transparent, and limited’ (my emphasis) (CDU 2002:
65–66).
The euro was mentioned early in the manifesto’s European section, and
CDU/CSU took credit for its creation and for the Stability Pact that accompanied
it. In contrast to the Social Democrats, the CDU/CSU defended the Stability Pact
and argued that the independence of the ECB was all-important (CDU 2002: 64).
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Apart from a segment on the eastward enlargement of the EU there was very
little of substantive importance in the CDU/CSU manifesto on either a Common
Foreign Policy or Common Defence and Security Policy. However, the segment
on enlargement struck a delicate balance between an ‘idealistic’ European dis-
course (‘enlargement as an historic opportunity’) and a more realist discourse
of national interest. In particular, the issue of enlargement was linked to the
rights of ethnic Germans in the accession countries, as well as the legacy of
those Germans expelled from former German territories following the Second
World War (particularly the Sudetenland, Silesia, and East Prussia). Finally, the
manifesto defended the system of transitional controls on the movement of labour
from accession countries put in place mainly at German behest over the past
few years.
Thus, to sum up, there was an inherent tension in the CDU/CSU’s position
on European issues, as spelt out in their 2002 manifesto. The manifesto made
much of the benefits of European integration but balanced this withmore assertive
passages about the German language, Germany’s representation in the EP, and
the rights of ethnic Germans. However, whether this represented a new ‘turn’ in
the parties’ position on Europe or was due more to the influence of Stoiber and
the CSU in this particular campaign remains to be seen. So, for the time being,
the parties’ position on European integration remains firmly at one with the pro-
European consensus.
2.7 THE RIGHT-WING FRINGE PARTIES
At the level of national politics in Germany, there are no ‘relevant’ parties to the
right of the CDU/CSU. This is the result of what was, and remains, a key strategic
aim of the Christian Democrats who, from the Adenauer era onwards, have tried
to absorb competitor parties on the political right (Klingemann and Volkens 1992:
190). As a result, although the Christian Democrats are flanked by right-wing
parties, these have not posed a serious electoral threat to them at the national
level of politics2. Nevertheless, these right-wing fringe parties—ranging from the
populist ‘Schill-party’ through to the extreme right-wing National Democratic
Party—remain an irritant within German party politics and their positions on
Europe are worthy of note.
The most moderate of the flanking parties is the Rule of Law State Offensive
Party (Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive, or PRO), also known as the ‘Schill Party’,
because it emerged as a vehicle for the populist lawyer Ronald Schill. Schill came
to national prominence in the late 1990s as a result of a hard-hitting campaign,
based around the themes of law and order and zero tolerance of crime, in his
native city-state of Hamburg. From 2000 onwards, the Schill Party made tentative
moves to become a political force at the national level but failed to make any
impact during the 2002 Bundestag elections. In 2003, Schill lost his post as Interior
Minister in Hamburg and was expelled from his own party following a series
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of political scandals. In so far as the party’s current electoral programme has a
position on European integration, it is subsumed into a discourse of law and
order, centred on domestic politics. No mention is made of the key themes of
the benefits of EU membership, EU institutions, the euro, eastward enlargement,
etc. In fact, the EU is only mentioned twice in the party’s programme. First,
the EU is blamed for imposing an unfair quota of asylum seekers and refugees
on Germany following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia (PRO 2003: 120). Au: PRO 2003
is not available
in the
reference list.
Please provide.
More constructively, however, it also argues that the EU is the appropriate forum
for the resolution of the asylum issue and the agreement of a common policy
between European states (PRO 2003: 13). Second, the EU is mentioned as an
arena for furthering the interests of Hamburg (PRO 2003: 13). In both of these
instances, the tone of the document is one of pragmatism rather than an explicitly
‘pro-European’ one. Beyond specific references to the EU, the idea of ‘European
culture’ is mentioned once, but only in terms of denigrating the supposedly non-
European culture of the ‘criminal foreigners’ that the party claims are the biggest
threat to law and order in Germany (PRO 2003: 20). In addition, Eastern Europe
is only mentioned once, in relation to what is seen as the region’s role in the
illegal traffic of refugees from the developing world (PRO 2003: 10). Taken in
the round, the party’s position on Europe is indistinct but it is certainly not
an active supporter of the European project in the way that the Greens, Social
Democrats, Free Democrats, and Christian Democrats broadly are. Nevertheless,
it is not Eurosceptic either and therefore for taxonomical purposes its position
on Europe is probably best classified as being (just) within the Euro-orthodox
camp.
To the right of the Schill Party is the Republican Party (Die Republikaner). The
Republican Party was founded inMunich in 1983 by ex members of the CSU, who
had left the party in protest at the decision of its then leader, Franz Josef Strauß, to
agree to substantial loans to the East German government. The leadership of the
new party was shared between three individuals, Franz Handlos, Ekkehard Voigt,
and Franz Schönhuber. The party’s original programme was broadly conservative
in tone and, although it argued for Germany to act more in its national interest,
essentially pro-EU integration. However, during the 1980s Schönhuber gradually
became ascendant within the party, the Republican’s ideological profile shifted
further to the right, and its position on Europe became more hostile. The party
enjoyed a spate of relatively good electoral performances in the late 1980s but
went into decline in the 1990s. In contrast to the Schill Party, the Republicans’
2002 federal party programme gave a high level of salience to European issues
and was deeply hostile to many aspects of the integration project. The document
dedicated an entire section, entitled ‘Europe of Fatherlands’, to the question of the
EU and stated unequivocally that the party ‘say(s) yes to Europe but no to this
EU’ (Republikaner 2002: 10). The programme went on to assert that ‘Europe’s
Au:
Republikaner
2002 is not
available in the
reference list.
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strength lies in its diversity’ and that therefore the EU should be no more than an
alliance of sovereign states, in which national law takes precedence over the aquis
communautaire. The ‘Christian character’ of Europe (Christlichen Abendlandes)
was also put centre stage (Republikaner 2002: 10). Specific proposals included: a
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referendum on continued membership, a limit on German contributions to the
EU budget, the dismantling of much of the EU bureaucracy, the ‘repatriation’
of key policy areas such as agriculture, the blocking of eastern enlargement until
the Benes and Bierut decrees are declared null and void, an absolute veto on any
future Turkish membership, Germany’s withdrawal from the Eurozone, and the
reinstatement of the mark (Republikaner 2002: 10–11). In short, although the
Republicans stopped short of advocating that Germany leave the EU in outright
terms, the implications of the party’s proposals meant that in practical terms that
is exactly what they were proposing. As such, the Republican Party’s position on
Europe can be classified as being one of Hard Euroscepticism.
Also on the far right of German party politics, the DVU was founded in 1971—
again in Munich—by Gerhard Frey. Frey originally intended the DVU to be a
cross-party alliance of right-wing conservatives stretching from the right wing of
the Christian Democrats to the more extreme right-wing National Democratic
Party. Over time, however, Frey transformed the DVU into a party in its own
right and moved it to a position clearly to the right of the Christian Democrats.
The party’s ideology is at the very least ultraconservative, with a tendency to blame
what it would consider to be ‘un-German’ groups (such as foreigners, Jews, or left-
wingers) for social problems such as unemployment. Unlike the Republicans, in
the party’s latest (2003) and rather vague programme, the DVU did not afford a
high level of salience to the EU. Nevertheless, in the two sections of the document
where it was mentioned the tone was generally hostile. In the first section, called
‘defending German interests’, the party castigated mainstream politicians for try-
ing to dissolve Germany into what it saw as a multinational state (DVU 2003: 2).
In addition the party argued that Foreign and Defence policy should remain a
prerogative of member states alone. Finally, like the Republicans, the DVU argued
for Germany’s withdrawal from the usage of euro and the restoration of the mark
(DVU 2003: 2). In the second section, called ‘securing pensions and social provi-
sion’, the party argued that German contributions to the EU should be reduced as
part of a general programme of withdrawal from Germany’s international finan-
cial commitments. In addition, Germany should regain control over agricultural
policy and move away from what it called the ‘EU mass production’ model of
agriculture (DVU 2003: 4–5). Thus, although the party was far less detailed in its
proposals than those put forward by the Republicans, they are essentially the same
in spirit in their consequences for Germany’s continued membership of the EU.
As a result, its stance on European integration can also be classified as one of Hard
Euroscepticism.
Finally, at the far right of the party spectrum is the oldest of the extant far
right parties, the NPD. The NPD was founded in Hanover in 1964 as result of the
collapse of the ultraconservative German Reich Party. It enjoyed some prominence
during the economic downturn of the mid-1960s but even then failed to scale
the 5 per cent electoral hurdle in the 1965 Bundestag elections. During the 1970s
and 1980s, the party operated on the fringe of the German party systems, often
in alliance with the DVU. However, in the 1990s, the party underwent a process
of radicalization and adopted a new strategy that included extra-parliamentary
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action and developing close links with the skinhead scene and other neo-Nazi
milieus. As a result, the Social Democrat–Green Federal government tried unsuc-
cessfully to ban the party. The recent statements of the party’s position on
European integration are its two manifestos for the 1999 elections to the EP
and the 2002 Bundestag elections. A comparison of the two documents reveals
that, with one interesting exception, the party’s position on Europe has remained
consistent throughout the period in question. The key themes in both documents
were hostility to the euro and to freedom of movement within the EU, both of
which the NPD regarded as being against the interests of the German people (NPD
1999, 2002). The party’s 1999 European election programme also promised to
stop the Agenda 2000 process and eastward enlargement (NPD 1999: 8), dras-
tically reduce Germany’s budget contributions (NPD 1999: 11), and block any
future Turkish membership of the EU (NPD 1999: 12). The interesting difference
between the two documents, however, lies in the party’s changing attitude to the
idea of a common European defence policy. Both documents were hostile to what
the party saw as US imperialism, but whilst the 1999 programme was hostile to
European defence co-operation and argued for a repatriation of defence policy
(NPD 1999: 11), the 2002 document argued for a European defence alliance as a
bulwark against the USA (NPD 2002: 2). This was not a particularly well thought
out or detailed proposal and was most probably included to appeal to the rising
tide of anti-US feeling in the Federal Republic in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq
War. Thus, it reveals the opportunistic nature of much of the German far right’s
positions on European integration. To sum up, the party’s position on Europe
is broadly consistent with that put forward by the Republicans and the DVU. It is
opposed to eastward enlargement, and wants to reverse the Schengen provisions
for open borders, restrict the movement of member state citizens within the
Union, reduce Germany’s contributions to the budget, and withdrawal from the
euro. As such, its position on European integration is to all intents and purposes
one of Hard Euroscepticism.
2.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Table 2.2 provides a typology of party positions on European integration in
the Federal Republic of Germany. The ‘national’ positions of parties are in the
enclosed cells. Broadly speaking, the position of the mainstream parties at the
national level can be defined as ‘European Consensual’. The one exception to
this is the PDS, which maintains a Soft Eurosceptic stance. However, the party’s
disastrous performance in the 2002 Bundestag elections raises doubts about its
future.
The national domain is dominated by the European consensus. But at the sub-
national or party-faction level one can see some degree of Soft Euroscepticism
beyond that of the PDS, encompassing elements of the Social Democrats’ left-
wing, the ‘national-liberal’ faction within the centrist Free Democrats, parts of the
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Table 2.2. A typology of party positions on European integration
in the Federal Republic of Germany
‘European Consensual’ ‘Soft’ Eurosceptic ‘Hard’ Eurosceptic
Greens PDS Republicans
DVU
NPD
SPD Elements of SPD left
FDP National-Liberal FDP
CDU/CSU∗ Elements of CDU right
(PRO)∗∗ CSU State Party
∗ The CDU and CSU are members of a joint parliamentary faction in the Bundestag
and are, therefore, effectively a single party at the Federal level.
∗∗ The PRO is in brackets because the lack of salience of the European issue in the
party’s programme mean that, for taxonomical purposes, it is classed here as being
‘European consensual’ by default.
CDU’s right-wing, and the dominant faction in the CSU’s state party organization
(led by Minister-President Edmund Stoiber). Finally, a third category encom-
passes the three far right parties, the VDU, the NPD, and the Republican Party.
This third category is less important than that of Soft Euroscepticism, because it is
made up of the fringe parties of the right which, although they operate within the
domain of national politics, are not represented in the Bundestag. Moreover, such
is the power of the European consensus in Germany that even these parties stop
short of openly advocating Germany’s withdrawal from the EU (although that is
the logical consequence of their positions on the key aspects of the integration
project).
Returning to the ‘national’ parties, in so far as they have ‘positions’ on Europe,
they are secondary to, and contingent upon, the parties’ wider ideological pro-
files. One can see some evidence—the Christian Democrats’ bullish commitment
to promoting the German language for instance—that the parties have tailored
manifesto statements on Europe to popular sentiment, but this is very much at the
margins. Moreover, as discussed earlier, broad public support for the EU remains
buoyant and has even recovered a little since the late 1990s. Consequently, none of
the parties problematize the issue of Europe per se, but rather adopt a technocratic
discourse and concentrate on particular aspects of European integration. Much
of these aspects—such as a Common Foreign Policy and a Common Defence
and Security Policy—are supported by up to eight out of ten Germans, and it
is perhaps no surprise that none of the mainstream parties chose to go against the
grain of popular opinion on these issues.
But where there are issues, such as trust in EU institutions and support for
enlargement, that do seem to generate unease amongst the electorate, the parties’
manifestos become more engaged and detailed in their analysis. Thus, despite
being a long way apart on their overall attitudes to European integration, both
parties of the left (the PDS and Greens) find common ground in a critique of
existing institutional arrangements and all the parties argue for greater powers for
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the EP and—in the case of the Free Democrats—the ECJ as well. The Greens crit-
icize the failure to encourage Turkey’s bid to join the EU and the Free Democrats
do not support the temporary restraints on the movement of services and labour
between the EU (except Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Ireland) and
accession countries. Nevertheless, by and large all the parties are broadly in favour
of eastward enlargement, despite public misgivings.
To sum up, there appear to be limits to the potential impact of party-based
Euroscepticism in Germany. There are many reasons for this, including the his-
torical and institutional variables mentioned at the start of this chapter and the
pragmatic acceptance that Germany has benefited from ‘real existing integration’.
Moreover, as already noted, there have been Eurosceptic ‘turns’ on the part of cer-
tain German Länder, but the chances of a coherent Eurosceptical agenda emerging
at this level of party politics or governance is remote, not least because of the
different levels of economic development between individual states and the fact
that they have different economic and political agendas. To conclude, ultimately
the failure of party-based Euroscepticism in Germany can be attributed to institu-
tional constraints, the low salience of European issues in public opinion, and the
fact that the political centre defines the parameters of the European debate—and,
with it, the maintenance of the pro-European consensus.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Lees (2000), Scharf (1994), Markovits and Gorski (1993), Kleinert
(1992), Hülsberg (1988), Bickerich (1985), Müller (1984), Papadakis (1983), and
Mettke 1982.
2. There have been one or two exceptions to this rule at the Land level, such as in
West Berlin in 1989 when the relative success of the right-wing Republican Party
was mainly at the expense of support for the incumbent CDU–Free Democratic Party
coalition. This led to the coalition being replaced by a SDU–Green coalition and the
Free Democrats failing to scale the city’s 5 per cent barrier to representation in the city
state’s parliament (Lees 2000).
